The value of publicly available, textual and non-textual information for startup performance prediction by Kaiser, Ulrich & Kuhn, Johan M.
DISCUSSION 
PAPER
/ /  U L R I C H  K A I S E R  A N D  J O H A N  M .  K U H N
/ /  N O . 2 0 - 0 1 2  |  0 3 / 2 0 2 0
The Value of Publicly Available,  
Textual and Non-textual In-
formation For Startup Perfor-
mance Prediction
The value of publicly available, textual and non-textual information
for startup performance prediction¶
This version: March 11, 2020
Ulrich Kaiser∗ and Johan M. Kuhn∗∗
Abstract
Can publicly available, web-scraped data be used to identify promising business startups at an early stage? To answer
this question, we use such textual and non-textual information about the names of Danish firms and their addresses as
well as their business purpose statements (BPSs) supplemented by core accounting information along with founder and
initial startup characteristics to forecast the performance of newly started enterprises over a five years’ time horizon.
The performance outcomes we consider are involuntary exit, above–average employment growth, a return on assets of
above 20 percent, new patent applications and participation in an innovation subsidy program. Our first key finding is
that our models predict startup performance with either high or very high accuracy with the exception of high returns
on assets where predictive power remains poor. Our second key finding is that the data requirements for predicting
performance outcomes with such accuracy are low. To forecast the two innovation-related performance outcomes well, we
only need to include a set of variables derived from the BPS texts while an accurate prediction of startup survival and
high employment growth needs the combination of (i) information derived from the names of the startups, (ii) data on
elementary founder-related characteristics and (iii) either variables describing the initial characteristics of the startup (to
predict startup survival) or business purpose statement information (to predict high employment growth). These sets of
variables are easily obtainable since the underlying information is mandatory to report upon business registration. The
substantial accuracy of our predictions for survival, employment growth, new patents and participation in innovation
subsidy programs indicates ample scope for algorithmic scoring models as an additional pillar of funding and innovation
support decisions.
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INTRODUCTION
Identifying promising startups is a formidable task for investors, creditors and policy mak-
ers alike. Even though each group often has quite a wealth of information available when
deciding about a possible involvement in a particular startup, this information must be pro-
cessed quickly which in turn implies that simple heuristics become highly valuable (Baum and
Wally 2001; Eisenhardt 1989; Kirsch et al. 2009). In addition, investors and creditors aim at
identifying promisinging startups early and therefore increasingly often use algorithmic scoring
models (Corea 2018; Diffey 2019; Palmer 2017). More generally, uncertainties in the ex-ante
evaluation of business opportunities are fundamental to the theory and the empirical testing
of entrepreneurial strategy (Ahuja et al. 2005; Amit et al. 1990; Dencker and Gruber 2015;
Nikiforou et al. 2019; Oriani and Sobrero 2008).
That publicly available information can be used to effectively measure entrepreneurial suc-
cess and hence to reduce uncertainties is demonstrated in seminal work by Guzman and Stern
(2015; G/S hereafter). G/S use information on firm and founder names, geographical location
as well as an indicator for a startup holding a patent at the time of foundation to measure
entrepreneurial success defined as either an IPO or an acquisition at the ZIP-code level. In
this paper, we study how well the initial G/S variables in combination with other publicly
available and similarly conveniently obtainable data can predict a broad range of performance
outcomes: involuntary exit, high employment growth, a return on assets of above 20 percent,
new patent applications and, as a more inclusive indicator of innovative activity, participation
in an innovation subsidy program.
Our set of performance predictors comprises of (i) the initial G/S firm name variables, (ii)
an extended set of variables derived from firm names, (iii) basic founder characteristics such
as gender and previous founding experience as well as business success, (iv) initial startup
characteristics like industry affiliation, initial assets and profits as well as address information
and (v) variables generated from firms’ business purpose statements (BPSs). BPSs are required
by most US states and most European countries as an integral part of the business formation
documents. They are, e.g., mandatory for corporations worldwide where they are also referred
to as “articles of organization”, “articles of incorporation” or “certificate of incorporation”.
We base our analysis on the population of Danish firms started as incorporated compa-
nies between 2012 and 2014, 55914 firms in total, whose data we web-scrape from government
websites. To assess the changes in forecasting accuracy that our extended lists of potential
predictors cause, we employ simple logit models for our five performance models and calculate
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the respective areas under the receiver-operator curve (AUC) as our main measure of predic-
tion accuracy. The AUC is a frequently applied forecast performance statistic for binary firm
performance models (Agarwal and Taffler 2008, A˚stebro and Winter 2012; Chava and Jarrow
2004). We assess the contribution of each set of explanatory variables since not all data may
be publicly available in all countries and since there are differences in their ease of use.
Our key findings are that (i) our models predict all performance outcomes with high accu-
racy with the exception of high return on assets, (ii) the data needed to generate our precise
forecasts are both easily obtainable and straightforward to apply in simple empirical models
and (iii) prediction accuracy can be substantially improved by including variables beyond the
ones initially suggested by G/S.
Predicting our two innovation-related performance indicators with high accuracy only re-
quires the set of variables we derive from the BPSs. Combining the BPS variables with the
initial G/S variables even leads to predictions of very high accuracy for new patent applications.
Accurately predicting involuntary exit and high employment growth is more data demanding
as both involve the combination of three different sets of variables. A satisfactory prediction
of involuntary exit and high employment growth needs the basic G/S variables in combination
with the set of founder characteristics. On top of these two sets of variables, predicting invol-
untary exit involves the set of initial startup characteristics while predicting high employment
growth entails the additional inclusion of the BPS-derived set of variables. Importantly, the
basic G/S variables, the founder characteristics and the data derived from the BPSs are likely
to be easily accessible since they are mandatory to report to the authorities upon business
registration. We hence not only demonstrate that it is possible to accurately predict startup
success, we also show that the data required to generate such accurate predictions may in fact
be readily available from public sources. This is of particular interest given a global trend
towards the opening of business register data to the public. Initiatives like the “Open Govern-
ment Partnership” with its explicit goal to ease the access to public data are getting more and
more traction with now including 79 countries worldwide. Data sets similar to ours hence are
or will soon be available in many other countries (https://www.opengovpartnership.org/).
Our paper unfolds as follows: we first present our data, then introduce our empirical meth-
ods, subsequently discuss our empirical results and finally conclude.
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DATA
Our core data is generated and collected by the Danish Business Authority (DBA), an adminis-
trative unit under the authority of the Danish Ministry of Business. We track all firms started
between 2012 and 2014 over a period of five years. The data comprises of the universe of 55914
firms registered as limited liability companies (LLCs), joint stock corporations or a new form
of a LLC called “ivæksætterselskab” (IVS) whose main difference to a standard LLC is that
it does not come with capital requirements and hence in effect without liabilities on part of
the owners. The DBA data also provide us with the company names and addresses, NACE
Rev. 2 industry codes, starting dates, total assets, profits, the number of employees as well
as the names and person identifiers of their founders. In addition, the DBA data contain the
BPSs since firms are obliged to report their business purpose as part of their general charters.
Business purpose statements are mandatory by the Danish Law of Corporated Firms which
provides firms with substantial leeway in their eventual formulation as there is no wordcount
limit and the BPSs only need to loosely describe a startups’ activity. As a consequence, many
BPSs are very generic (“The purpose of this firm is to do trading.”) while others are very
specific.1 We shall make use of this heterogeneity in our empirical analysis.
Dependent variables
We consider five alternative performance variables: (i) involuntary exit, (ii) high employment
growth, (iii) a return on assets of above 20 percent, (iv) at least one patent after foundation
and (v) participation in an innovation subsidy program; variables that, except for the last
one, are commonly used in management and economics. New business survival is very widely
studied (Audretsch and Mahmood 1995; Cassar 2014; Chava and Jarrow 2004; Gimmon and
Levie 2010). Visitin and Pittino (2014) as well as Wennberg et al. (2011) consider employment
growth as a main performance outcome. Return on asset is considered by Morgan et al. (2009)
as well as Cornett and Tehranian (1992) while patents are standard indicators for innovative
activity (Blundell et al. 1995; Griliches 1990; Kaiser et al. 2015, 2019). However, not all
inventions are patented and not all inventions can be patented (Arundel and Kabla 1998). We
therefore consider participation in an innovation subsidy program as an additional and broader
indicator of innovative activity. All Danish innovation subsidy programs are competitive and
reviewed, which in turn implies that the program sponsors assessed that the applicant firm
exceeds the quality threshold for the respective subsidization program.
1E.g., “The company’s purpose is to design and develop, manufacture and assemble switchboards, steering and control
boards, PLC/PC/SRO solutions, automation and pre-finished projects for use by fitters, OEM/system manufacturers and
the industry in general at a quality and at a price that entails that customers, suppliers and other stakeholders regard the
company as an attractive and professional partner.”
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We measure all performance variables within the first five years after establishment, except
for return on assets which we measure within the first three years after foundation due to a
substantial increase in missing information over a five year time horizon — many firms that
started in 2014 have not yet submitted in their fifth year financial report. We define involuntary
exits as closures due to bankruptcy and compulsory dissolution enforced by the regulatory au-
thorities due to non-compliance to administrative requirements. It does not include dissolution
after a merger or an acquisition which would count as business success (Bates 2005; Detienne
and Wennberg 2014; G/S) or voluntary exits. Employment figures are provided in categories
of 0, 1, 2-4, 5-9, 10-199 and more than 199 employees. We term startups that increase employ-
ment by at least two categories as “high employment growth” businesses since each category
implies a doubling of the number of employees. Our final two performance measures refer
to innovative performance: patents and participation in an innovation subsidy program. Our
patent application data originates in the “PatStat” database provided by the European Patent
Office to which researchers at Copenhagen Business School have attached the unique Danish
identifiers which allow us to combine our data sets (Kaiser et al. 2015; 2019). It includes all
patents filed at the European Patent Office or the World Intellectual Property Organization
that involve at least one Danish applicant or inventor. We have data on the universe of Danish
innovation support schemes collected by Danish Ministry of Higher Education and Science at
our disposal.2
Explanatory variables
We relate our five performance variables to our five sets of explanatory variables, e.g. the
basic G/S variables, the extended G/S firm name variables, founder characteristics, startup
characteristics and BPS information, as well as combinations thereof.
(i) The G/S variables: Our first set of explanatory variables follows Guzman and Stern
(2015). Their model to predict startup performance contains dummy variables for (i) the firm
name being eponymous (i.e. it reflects one of the founder’s names), (ii) the firm name being
short or long, (iii) the geographical location appearing in the firm name (specified as a dummy
for any geographical location like a city, village or region appearing in the firm name and
another dummy for the terms “Denmark”, “Danish” or “Dan” in the firm name) (iv) the legal
form (dummies for corporations and IVSs with LLCs as base category), (v) the geographic
regions the firm is residing in and (vi) the startup commanding over at least one patent at the
time of foundation.
(ii) The extended G/S variables: We extend this basic set of variables derived from the firm
2This data was made available to us via the project “Investments, Incentives and the Impact of Danish Research” sponsored
by the Novo Nordisk Foundation.
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names by dummy variables for the firm name containing (i) a “proper” word which we define
based on the dictionary of Danish words as a proxy for the firm name containing information
on what the firm actually does (like “baking”, “consulting” or “plumbing”), (ii) the terms
“holding”, “capital”, “invest” or “share” in the firm name to identify holding companies as well
as (iii) a female name and (iv) a male name. We in addition include a (v) founder name index
since social psychology and economics suggest that person names constitute strong indicators
of a persons’ background (Fryer et al. 2004; Gerhards and Hans 2009; Goldstein and Stecklov
2016; Mehrabian 1997). To account for potential information contained in founder names, we
build a “name index” by calculating the name-specific average performance of firms started by
founders with a focal given name. We e.g. find that 15 percent of the founders named “Ulrich”
face a forced exit within the first five years while this is the case for ten percent of the founders
with the given name “Johan”. For solo founders named Ulrich this generates an index of 0.15,
for founders named Johan it is 0.1. For team foundations we take the averages across the set
of founder names.
(iii) The human capital variables: As a third set of variables we employ information on the
startups’ founders at the time of business foundation. These include dummy variables for (i) at
least one founder being a legal entity, (ii) at least one founder having a female first name, (iii)
at least one founder having a male first name, (iv) the startup being founded by a team (e.g.
more than one person founder), (v) the five number of employees categories described above
with this information being missing as the comparison group, (vi) one of the founders having
previously founded between one and three other firms and (vii) one of the founders having
previously founded between more than three other firms and (viii) one of the founders having
previously experienced an involuntary exit.
Firm size at startup has been shown to be highly correlated with post-entry performance
(Arora and Nandkumar 2011; Bonardo et al. 2011; Bru¨derl et al. 1992; Clarysse et al. 2011;
Delmar and Shane 2004; Ensley and Hmieleski 2005; Visintin and Pittini 2014; Zahra et al.
2007) and the same is true for gender (Delmar and Shane 2004; Davidsson and Honig 2003;
Wennberg et al. 2011). We control for team foundations because they are said to have an edge
over solo founders since teams pool human and financial resources instead of being dependent
on the solo entrepreneur (Eesley et al. 2014; Eisenhardt and Schoonhoven 1990), a view recently
challenged by Greenberg and Mollick (2018). The importance of previous founder experience
is widely demonstrated (e.g. Baron and Ensley 2006; Dencker and Gruber 2015; Eesley and
Roberts 2006a,b; Gompers et al. 2006; Westhead et al. 2005) which motivates our inclusion of
the previous founding experience dummies. We additionally control for previous involuntary
exit (Cope 2010; Hayward et al. 2010; Nielsen and Sarasvathy 2016; Wagner 2002).
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(iv) The firm characteristics: Our fourth set of explanatory variables concerns itself with
the characteristics of the startup. Financial information has long been used as a predictor for
business performance (Altman 1968, 1984; Bru¨derl et al. 1992; Dambolena and Khoury 1980;
Huyghebaert et al. 2000; Laitinen 1992). We account for total assets and total profits in the
first year. Both variables are missing for half of our observations, a “sparsity of data” problem
that is very common in big datasets. Following Gelman and Hill (2007), we set the missing
corresponding explanatory variables to zero and in order to distinguish genuine 0s from the
artificially created 0s introduce an additional dummy for such replacements having taken place.
Since information on total assets is missing in all cases where information on profits is missing
as well, we only need to include a single indicator for such a replacement having taken place.
We operationalize total profits by using quantiles dummies while we take the natural logarithm
of profits.
Our data contains detailed address information and we use this text as data to create indica-
tors for the business history of each address and for the address being shared with other firms.
Specifically, we include a dummy variable for at least one involuntary exit at the respective
address as well as another dummy variable for nine or more involuntary exits at the address.
These two dummy variables may serve as proxies for the overall attractiveness of the location
and other characteristics associated with the given address. We control for how many other
firms reside under the same address since many corporations often co-reside with their associ-
ated holding companies by including dummies for the address being shared by 2-5, 6-10 and
more than 10 other firms with the address being unshared being the base category. In addition,
we account for the present address having previously been used by 1-5, 6-10, 11-100 and more
than 100 firms. To account for differences across sectors (Bru¨derl et al. 1992; Clarysse et al.
2011), we include a set of NACE Rev. 2 one digit sector dummy variables. A missing sector
classification constitutes our base category. To more precisely account for sectoral heterogene-
ity without being forced to include a large set of sectoral dummy variables, we include mean
industry performance for all our five performance indicators which we calculate on the basis of
the Danish Industry Classification that is slightly more detailed than NACE Rev. 2 four digit
level.3
(v) The BPS data: Our fifth set of explanatory variables uses the BPS data. Before turn-
ing the BSP text data into explanatory variables we remove words and phrases which do not
contain information relevant to our analysis, an approach called “stopping” in computer lin-
guistics. Examples for stopwords are “the”, “because”, “between” or “against”. In addition,
3For example, if 30 percent of other firms in the regression sample in a focal firm’s industry experience high employment
growth, the associated mean performance for in this industry is 0.3.
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we “stemmed” all words in the BPSs. Stemming reduces words to their roots, e.g. the words
“automation” and “automated” would both be reduced to their root “autom”. We use the
dictionary of the Danish Language Authority as our source for stemming. After stopping and
stemming we define three subsets of BPS-related variables that either relate to BPS complex-
ity, to its specificity or to its very content. As measures of BPS complexity we consider (i)
the “LIX” due to Bjo¨rnsson (1968) which has found widespread application in text analysis.
It is calculated as the sum of the percentage of words of more than six letters and the average
number of words per BPS in our context. The higher the LIX, the higher is the complexity
of the text. We in addition use complexity-related variables measuring (ii) mean word length,
(iii) BPS length and (iv) dummy variables for the quintiles of the BPS length distribution to
put BPS length into perspective. To measure BPS specificity we use counts of how many times
a “proper” word in a focal BPS appears in the universe of BPSs. We operationalize these
counts as (v) the frequency with which the least common word in a focal BPS appears in the
universe of BPSs and (vi) the frequency with which the most common word in a focal BPS
appears in the universe of BPSs. We also control for the ratio of these two variables. Similar
to our treatment of our firm name information we finally create the following content-related
variables: (vii) a dummy for a geographic term appearing in the BPS, (viii) a dummy variable
for a male name appearing in the BPS and (ix) a dummy variable for a female name appearing
in the BPS. As a final subset of the BPS variables we generate (x) “wordscore indices” that
measure the mean “performance” of firms’ BPSs for each of our five performance indicators.
The wordscore approach has been developed in political sciences where it has found widespread
application in inferring political positions in text documents on the basis of scores for words
derived from documents (Laver et al. 2003). It is perhaps best illustrated by providing an ex-
ample. A share of 47.4 percent of the startups with the word “discotheque” in their BPSs face
an involuntary exit while this is true for 36.4 percent of the startups with the word “delivery”
in their BPSs. The wordscore associated with the word “discotheque” is defined as the word’s
average “performance” and hence is 0.474 while the other wordscore is 0.364. To aggregate the
individual wordscores at the firm name level, we take the average of the individual wordscores.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of our dependent and explanatory variables. It shows
that involuntary exits are comparatively rare events with 17.2 percent of the firms in our data
involuntarily exiting within five years of operation, a figure that is substantially lower than the
50 percent overall exits reported by e.g. Headd (2003) or Mata and Portugal (1994). Different
to those studies we focus, however, on involuntary exits as well as firms with a legal form that
requires registration and consider the universe of startups instead of merely technology-driven
ones. A tenth of the firms in our data generate substantial employment growth while 17 percent
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achieve a high return on assets. By contrast, participation in an innovation subsidy program
and taking out a new patent are both rare events. A mere 1.6 percent of our firms participate
in innovation subsidy programs while only 0.3 percent apply for a new patent within their first
five years of existence.
More than 40 percent of all startups are founded in the capital greater Copenhagen region,
only 0.4 percent of all firms has applied for a patent at the time of foundation, about a third of
the startups involve another firm as a founder, 87 percent of the startups are founded by men,
more than 89 percent are solo foundations and 46 percent are founded by serial entrepreneurs
which compares to a European average of 30 percent and a US average of 13 percent (Plehn-
Dujowich 2010). Turning to the information contained in the BPSs, the average LIX is 54 which
is considered as “difficult” by Bjo¨rnsson (1968). The mean word length is at 9.4 characters while
average BSP lengths is 41.3 characters.
The correlations between our explanatory variables are modest with our largest variance
inflation factor being 2.56 which is well below the critical value of 10 (Belsley et al. 1980).
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
Empirical strategy
Our empirical aim is twofold: we want to analyze (i) the degree of accuracy to which pub-
licly available data can be used to forecast business startup performance and (ii) what sets
of variables — and combinations thereof — are best at predicting performance since not all
variables may be equally easy to get a handle on. We seek to achieve our goals by subsequently
introducing our five different sets of explanatory variables as well as their combinations in logit
performance regressions and by subsequently assessing the out-of-sample prediction accuracy
of our specifications. We estimate our models on a 70 percent random sample and retain the
remaining 30 percent for prediction, following G/S. We calculate our firm name indices and our
BPS wordscores as well as the average industry performance index on the regression sample
and extrapolate them to our holdout sample.
Our focus is on the prediction of outcomes and we therefore present the forecasting accuracy
statistics only and relegate logit coefficient estimation results for our full models to Appendix
A. We apply three different prediction accuracy measures: (i) the AUC, (ii) the log-likelihodd
value and (iii) the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC). Our focus is on the AUC as a standard
measure of forecast performance of binary models (Hand 2001). It illustrates the performance
of a classification model like ours by plotting the observed rate of outcomes against the rate
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of false positive outcomes at pre-specified threshold levels (the receiver-operator curve, ROC),
deciles in our case as in Cooper et al. (1993). The area under thes curve is a measure of
predictive accuracy where an AUC of 0.5 suggests no predictive power at all while a value
of 1 corresponds to perfect prediction. Bradley (1997) defines a model that corresponds to
an AUC of between 0.5 and 0.6 as a “fail’, values between 0.6 and 0.7 as “poor”, between
0.7 and 0.8 as “fair”, between 0.8 and 0.9 as “good” and values above 0.9 as “excellent”. In
addition, we calculate the percentage changes in the AUC compared to the specification that
uses the Guzman/Stern set of variables only. Almost all our models include the basic G/S
set of variables which allows us to compare the log-likelihood values of the basic G/S model
to the richer models as suggested by standard textbooks (Greene 2017; Wooldridge 2016)
as a second prediction accuracy statistic. Our results table displays the percentage change
in the log-likelihood statistics compared to the G/S benchmark model which is equal to the
relative change in the associated likelihood-ratio test statistics. These test statistics cannot
reject that all models that include variables beyond the basic G/S ones are jointly statistically
highly significant; i.e., the fuller models have statistically significantly larger explanatory power
than the base G/S specification. This is why we do not provide the p-values in our results
table. Our third alternative useful textbook statistic to study differences between both non-
nested and nested models is the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), a statistic frequently
used for model selection (Kass and Raftery 1995). Adding additional parameters may lead to
overfitting, a problem which the BIC attempts to solve by penalizing extra parameters added
to the empirical model. The preferred model is the one with the lowest BIC. Our results table
displays the changes in the BIC relative to the basic G/S model along with a categorization of
these percentage changes into “not worth more than a mention” (abbreviated in the table by
“none”), “positive”, “strong” and “very strong” which correspond to changes between 0 and 2,
2 to 6, 6 to 10 and above 10 respectively (Jeffreys 1935; Kass and Raftery 1995).
Results
Table 2 presents our prediction outcomes. A first striking finding is that the information
contained in our BPS-related variables is rich enough to alone predict the two innovation–
related outcomes with “good” accuracy. An even “excellent” accuracy is achieved once the
BPS data is combined with both the human capital variables and the basic G/S variables.
An “excellent” predictive performance is not obtained for any other performance outcome.
A second striking result is that all our specifications poorly predict a high return on assets.
Even though combining the initial G/S variables with the firm characteristics and the BPS
information leads to a massive improvement in predictive accuracy by 22.2 percent as measured
by the AUC, it still remains“poor” with an AUC of 0.686.
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Involuntary exit is predicted with “good” accuracy with an AUC of 0.801 when the basic G/S
variables are combined with the set of human capital variables and the BPS data. Predictive
power can be increased by 2.7 percent if the BPS variables are added as well, leading to an AUC
of 0.823. Adding even more variable sets does, however, not increase predictive power. Similarly,
it also needs the combination of at least three sets of variable, the basic G/S variables, the
human capital and the BPS variables, to attain “good” predictive accuracy for high employment
growth. Adding variables sets beyond these three actually decreases AUC since AUC penalizes
the number of explanatory variables.
Turning to the changes in the log-likelihood function as alternative prediction accuracy
measures, we naturally find that the more sets of variables we include, the larger the log-
likelihood values become because logit models maximize the log-likelihood functions without
penalizing the number of explanatory variables. These improvements are largest for adding the
set of startup characteristics and the set of BPS-related variables to the initial G/S specification,
which is a finding that reinforces our initial AUC-based results. Likewise, the changes in the
BIC echo these initial results as well since the addition of the set of initial startup characteristics
and the BPS-related variables lead to “strong” or “very strong” reductions in the BIC.
To sum up, our models predict startup survival, high employment growth and participa-
tion in an innovation subsidy program well. They predict new patents very well but fail to
predict high returns on assets with acceptable accuracy. Our results show that it is sufficient
to include the BPS-related variables to generate a “good” predictive accuracy for new patents
and participation in an innovation subsidy program. To get the “excellent” predictive accu-
racy for new patents the BPS variables need to be combined with the basic G/S variables and
the founder characteristics. An accurate prediction of involuntary exit and high employment
growth requires the combination of the three sets of variables where both predictions need the
basic G/S variables and the human capital characteristics. Predicting involuntary exit in ad-
dition involves the inclusion of the startup characteristics while the high employment growth
forecast additionally entails the BPS-generated variables. We hence find that the initial G/S
variables, the human capital variables and the BPS-related variables are key contributors to
startup success prediction. At the same time, these variables are particularly easy to obtain
since they are primarily based on textual information on the names of the startups and their
founders and therefore data that is mandatory to report upon business registration.
Robustness checks
Even though all data we use in our analysis is publicly available, not all variables may be easily
obtainable in all countries. In addition, not all variable are equally simple to process. The
initial G/S variables include information on whether or not a startup has applied for a patent
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at the time of incorporation while the set of human capital variables includes initial firm size.
Even though information on previous patenting activity is easily gathered via online searches
for individual firms, it is very cumbersome to match startups to their corresponding patenting
history on a broader scale. Likewise, publicly available information on startups often does
not contain information on initial firm size which limits the direct applicability of our startup
characteristics variables. Finally, the wordscores constitute important elements of the set of
BPS-related variables. Again, while individual BPSs indeed are easily obtainable, processing
the universe of BPSs may be more demanding. In our robustness checks we therefore test the
extend to which leaving out the information on inital patents, initial firm size and wordscores
affects prediction accuracy.
Omitting initial firm size reduces the predictive accuracy for involuntary exit and partici-
pation in an innovation subsidy program by 0.28 and 0.03 percentage points, respectively. Not
surprisingly given that there is likely to be state dependence in firm size (Audretsch et al. 1999),
it is more relevant for high employment growth where the average reduction is 4.65 percentage
points. It also matters for applying for at least one new patent where the average reduction
is 1.92 percentage points. We nevertheless obtain an “excellent” prediction accuracy for new
patents and a “good” prediction accuracy for high employment growth.
Omitting initial patents from the specifications leaves the prediction accuracy for involuntary
exit and high employment growth essentially unchanged. The predictive power for new patents
only drops by 0.89 percentage points, despite state dependence in patenting activity being
well documented (Blundell et al. 1995; Kaiser et al. 2015, 2018). It does matter, however, for
predicting participation in an innovation subsidy program where the decrease is 4.83 percentage
points on average and where we no longer achieve “good” predictive accuracy with a maximum
AUC of 0.799, or 0.13 percentage points short of “good” category.
Leaving out the three variables that are either likely to be harder to gather or to process
has hence very little effect on prediction accuracy overall.
CONCLUSIONS
Easily accessible and publicly available data, both textual and non-textual, are starting to
become easily accessible in most modern economies. We show how such data can be used to
predict the expected performance of newly started enterprises with substantial accuracy. Such
performance predictions are of great importance to investors, creditors and policy makers alike.
Investors may not only want to assess the prospects of a business that asks for funding, they
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may also be interested in identifying promising startups before they even apply. Some investors
have already embraced “algorithmic scoring” models (Corea 2018; Diffey 2019; Palmer 2017)
and our paper indicates that it is well possible to successfully use such methods. Even though
banks are unlikely to be equally proactive, they may as well want to more firmly base their debt
financing decisions on objective data-driven grounds. Finally, policy makers may gain from the
improved identification of promising startups in order to be better gear innovation support
programs towards such firms and to improve the tailoring of startup promotion programs more
generally.
For our predictions, we use data on the universe of Danish firms started between 2012 and
2014 to run simple logit regressions to show that key performance outcomes such as survival,
employment growth, patenting activity as well as participation in competitive and audited in-
novation support programs can be predicted with high accuracy using publicly available data
alone. Our models essentially only require “text as data” information that startups have to
report when they register: startup names, founder identities, addresses and business purpose
statements. Even though including hard-to-get or hard-to-process additional information on
initial firm size, initial patents and an index of the relatedness of words used in the buiness
purpose statements to aggregate startup performance improves prediction accuracy, such more
intricate data is not necessary to forecast startup performance with substantial precision. How-
ever, even our most complex model was unable to predict returns on asset of above 20 percent
with even modest accuracy.
Our finding that we are — apart for our outcome variable high return on assets — are able
to forecast startup performance with substantial accuracy using publicly available data alone
suggests that there are ample opportunities for the early identification of promising startups.
The fact that we use simple logit models, a standard workhorse in the anaylsis of binary
outcomes, makes our approach applicable to a wide range of users.
The data we use have recently become publicly available through the open data policy
adopted by the Danish government in 2017 as part of the “Open Government Partnership”
initiative that started in 2011 and now includes 79 countries worldwide. This paper shows that
such open data policies indeed are effective in improving economic decision making at very low
cost.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Dummy Mean Std.dev. Dummy Mean Std.dev.
Dependent variables Startup characteristics
Involuntary exit 1 0.172 Total assets year 1 0 12280 186841
High employment growth 1 0.095 Total assets year 1 is missing 1 0.503
High return on assets 1 0.170 1st quintile profits year 1 1 0.099
Innovation subsidy program 1 0.016 2nd quintile profits year 1 1 0.102
New patent 1 0.003 3rd quintile profits year 1 1 0.092
Explanatory variables 4th quintile profits year 1 1 0.102
Guzman/Stern firm name variables 5th quintile profits year 1 1 0.102
Eponymous firm name 1 0.146 Previous exit at same address 1 0.265
Short firm name 1 0.190 >9 previous exits at same address 1 0.047
Medium long firm name 1 0.646 Adress unshared 1 0.151
Long firm name 1 0.164 Adress shared with 2-5 other firms 1 0.500
Firm name: w/ geogr. location 1 0.056 Adress shared with 6-10 other firms 1 0.134
Firm name w/ Danmark, Danish, Dan 1 0.021 Adress shared with >10 other firms 1 0.214
Legal form: corporation 1 0.050 Address previously unused 1 0.132
Legal form: IVS 1 0.099 Address previously used by 1-5 others 1 0.423
Legal form: LLC 1 0.851 Address previously used by 6-10 others 1 0.138
Geogr. region: Midtjylland 1 0.217 Address previously used by 11-100 others 1 0.230
Geogr. region: Nordjylland 1 0.081 Address previously used by > 100 others 1 0.077
Geogr. region: Sjælland 1 0.111 Sector 1 1 0.032
Geogr. region: Syddanmark 1 0.165 Sector 2 1 0.145
Geogr. region: Greater Copenhagen 1 0.425 Sector 3 1 0.039
Patents at foundation 1 0.004 Sector 4 1 0.161
Extended Guzman/Stern firm name variables Sector 5 1 0.062
In firm name: a proper danish word 1 0.475 Sector 6 1 0.029
In firm name: Holding, capital, shares 1 0.282 Sector 7 1 0.012
In firm name: female name 1 0.081 Sector is missing 1 0.520
In firm name: male name 1 0.158 Mean ind. perf. invol. exit 0 0.173 0.084
Founder name index invol. exit 0 0.171 0.070 Mean ind. perf. high empl. growth 0 0.079 0.057
Founder name high empl. growth 0 0.082 0.035 Mean ind. perf. high ret. on assets 0 0.142 0.057
Founder name high ret. on assets 0 0.135 0.038 Mean ind. perf. new patents 0 0.016 0.038
Founder name new patents 0 0.018 0.012 Mean ind. perf. innov. subsidy program 0 0.005 0.024
Founder name innov. subsidy program 0 0.006 0.006 BPS information
Human capital variables LIX 0 54.0 9.6
At least one founders is firm 1 0.369 Mean word length 0 9.4 2.2
At least one of founder has female first name 1 0.180 BPS lengths 0 41.3 33.0
At least one of founder has male first name 1 0.868 BPS 1st quintile 1 0.192
Team 1 0.111 BPS 2nd quintile 1 0.195
# employees year 1: 0 1 0.042 BPS 3rd quintile 1 0.201
# employees year 1: 1 1 0.068 BPS 4th quintile 1 0.203
# employees year 1: (2,4) 1 0.069 BPS 5th quintile 1 0.208
# employees year 1: (5,9) 1 0.030 Frequency of least common word 0 1247 2160
# employees year 1: (6,49) 1 0.025 Frequency of most common word 0 5673 3818
# employees year 1: missing 1 0.767 Freq. least/freq. most common word 0 0.291 0.370
No previous founding experience 1 0.198 A geogr. term name is in BPS 1 0.020
Previously founded 1-3 firms 1 0.463 A male name is in BPS 1 0.022
Previously founded more than 3 firms 1 0.212 A female name is in BPS 1 0.011
Earlier invol. exit by one founder 1 0.084 BPS wordscore invol. exit 0 0.163 0.071
BPS wordscore high empl. growth 0 0.080 0.045
BPS wordscore high ret. on assets 0 0.144 0.045
BPS wordscore new patents 0 0.019 0.020
BPS wordscore innov. subsidy program 0 0.006 0.009
Standard deviations are displayed for continuous variables only.
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Table 2: Prediction accuracy
Sets of variables included Log
G/S G/S Hum. Firm likeli-
basic ext. cap. char. BPS ROC-AUC hood BIC
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Value Cat. ∆ ∆ ∆ Cat. dof
Involuntary exit
x 0.623 poor 0.0 0.0 0.0 none 14
x 0.636 poor 2.0 — -3.0 positive 5
x 0.699 poor 12.1 — -4.5 positive 12
x 0.719 fair 15.3 — -7.7 strong 23
x 0.720 fair 15.5 — 35.2 very strong 14
x x 0.683 poor 9.6 5.4 -5.2 positive 19
x x 0.740 fair 18.7 8.3 -7.8 strong 26
x x 0.745 fair 19.5 10.4 -9.6 strong 37
x x 0.743 fair 19.2 8.2 -7.8 strong 28
x x x 0.763 fair 22.5 12.4 -11.8 very strong 31
x x x 0.755 fair 21.2 13.4 -12.5 very strong 42
x x x 0.751 fair 20.5 11.0 -10.3 very strong 33
x x x 0.801 good 28.5 17.7 -16.5 very strong 49
x x x 0.796 fair 27.7 15.4 -14.5 very strong 40
x x x 0.780 fair 25.2 14.3 -13.1 very strong 51
x x x x 0.823 good 32.0 21.0 -19.4 very strong 63
x x x x 0.784 fair 25.8 16.4 -15.0 very strong 56
x x x x 0.801 good 28.5 17.5 -16.4 very strong 45
x x x x 0.825 good 32.4 21.4 -20.1 very strong 54
x x x x x 0.824 good 32.2 22.5 -20.7 very strong 68
High employment growth
x 0.591 fail 0.0 0.0 0.0 none 14
x 0.668 poor 13.0 — -8.0 strong 5
x 0.673 poor 13.8 — -4.5 positive 12
x 0.679 poor 14.8 — -6.5 strong 23
x 0.790 fair 33.6 — 25.2 very strong 14
x x 0.684 poor 15.8 8.1 -7.7 strong 19
x x 0.694 poor 17.5 5.6 -5.0 positive 26
x x 0.699 poor 18.2 8.1 -6.9 strong 37
x x 0.794 fair 34.3 12.5 -11.7 very strong 28
x x x 0.750 fair 26.9 13.0 -12.0 very strong 31
x x x 0.729 fair 23.3 13.4 -11.8 very strong 42
x x x 0.787 fair 33.2 14.7 -13.6 very strong 33
x x x 0.743 fair 25.6 12.8 -10.9 very strong 49
x x x 0.829 good 40.2 17.9 -16.4 very strong 40
x x x 0.790 fair 33.6 16.2 -14.1 very strong 51
x x x x 0.824 good 39.4 21.2 -18.5 very strong 63
x x x x 0.785 fair 32.9 18.0 -15.7 very strong 56
x x x x 0.825 good 39.6 20.4 -18.6 very strong 45
x x x x 0.828 good 40.1 21.3 -19.1 very strong 54
x x x x x 0.822 good 39.0 23.4 -20.5 very strong 68
Return on assets of above 20 percent
x 0.561 fail 0.0 0.0 0.0 none 14
x 0.588 fail 4.8 — -2.1 positive 5
x 0.596 fail 6.3 — -1.5 none 12
x 0.629 poor 12.0 — -4.2 positive 23
x 0.660 poor 17.5 — 37.4 very strong 14
x x 0.596 fail 6.2 2.1 -1.9 none 19
x x 0.608 poor 8.3 1.8 -1.4 none 26
x x 0.637 poor 13.4 5.0 -4.2 positive 37
x x 0.661 poor 17.8 3.9 -3.4 positive 28
x x x 0.620 poor 10.5 3.7 -3.1 positive 31
x x x 0.640 poor 13.9 6.4 -5.3 positive 42
x x x 0.652 poor 16.2 4.9 -4.2 positive 33
x x x 0.654 poor 16.5 6.2 -4.9 positive 49
x x x 0.674 poor 20.1 5.5 -4.5 positive 40
x x x 0.677 poor 20.6 7.2 -5.9 positive 51
x x x x 0.686 poor 22.2 8.3 -6.5 strong 63
x x x x 0.670 poor 19.4 8.1 -6.5 strong 56
x x x x 0.666 poor 18.6 6.4 -5.3 positive 45
x x x x 0.681 poor 21.4 7.8 -6.3 strong 54
x x x x x 0.679 poor 20.9 9.2 -7.3 strong 68
At least one new patent
x 0.721 fair 0.0 0.0 0.0 none 14
x 0.747 fair 3.7 — -3.3 positive 5
x 0.733 fair 1.7 — -0.3 none 12
x 0.752 fair 4.3 — -6.9 strong 23
x 0.885 good 22.7 — 14.7 very strong 14
x x 0.795 fair 10.3 7.0 -6.0 positive 19
x x 0.787 fair 9.2 5.5 -3.3 positive 26
x x 0.794 fair 10.2 12.1 -7.9 strong 37
x x 0.894 good 24.1 21.6 -18.7 very strong 28
x x x 0.814 good 13.0 9.8 -6.7 strong 31
x x x 0.831 good 15.3 16.9 -11.8 very strong 42
x x x 0.898 good 24.6 24.9 -21.1 very strong 33
x x x 0.825 good 14.4 15.4 -9.1 strong 49
x x x 0.903 excellent 25.3 25.0 -20.0 very strong 40
x x x 0.899 good 24.7 25.8 -18.9 very strong 51
x x x x 0.903 excellent 25.3 28.4 -19.4 very strong 63
x x x x 0.901 excellent 24.9 28.8 -20.9 very strong 56
x x x x 0.906 excellent 25.6 27.5 -21.6 very strong 45
x x x x 0.911 excellent 26.4 27.4 -19.9 very strong 54
x x x x x 0.904 excellent 25.4 30.7 -20.8 very strong 68
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Sets of variables included Log
G/S G/S Hum. Firm likeli-
basic ext. cap. char. BPS ROC-AUC hood BIC
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) Val. Cat. ∆ ∆ ∆ Cat. dof
Participation in an innovation subsidy program
x 0.745 fair 0.0 0.0 0.0 none 14
x 0.655 poor -12.1 — -12.8 very strong 5
x 0.635 poor -14.8 — -19.7 very strong 12
x 0.745 fair 0.0 — -15.8 very strong 22
x 0.883 good 18.5 — -49.2 very strong 14
x x 0.758 fair 1.8 6.5 1.3 none 19
x x 0.763 fair 2.5 5.4 -5.7 positive 26
x x 0.769 fair 3.3 8.1 -12.1 very strong 36
x x 0.872 good 17.1 11.2 -0.6 none 26
x x x 0.774 fair 3.9 10.5 -5.6 positive 31
x x x 0.775 fair 4.0 13.3 -11.8 very strong 41
x x x 0.862 good 15.7 15.7 -1.1 none 31
x x x 0.784 fair 5.2 12.3 -18.8 very strong 48
x x x 0.863 good 15.8 16.1 -6.8 strong 38
x x x 0.835 good 12.1 17.3 -14.3 very strong 48
x x x x 0.836 good 12.2 21.2 -21.3 very strong 60
x x x x 0.831 good 11.5 21.2 -15.3 very strong 53
x x x x 0.856 good 14.9 19.6 -8.0 strong 43
x x x x 0.836 good 12.2 19.3 -17.0 very strong 53
x x x x x 0.834 good 12.0 24.3 -22.9 very strong 65
The five sets of explanatory variables are (i) the basic G/S variables, (ii) the extended set of G/S variables, (iii) the human
capital variables, (iv) the firm characteristics and (v) the BPS variables. “Val.’ refers to the value of the respective test
statistic while ∆ refers to its percentage change relative to the basic G/S model. Changes in the log-likelihood statistic cannot
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Appendix A: Logit estimates
High High Inno.
Involuntary exit empl. ret. On subsidy New
exit growth assets program patent
Eponymous firm name -0.222*** -0.098 0.077* -0.219 0.736
(0.053) (0.089) (0.045) (0.267) (0.593)
Short firm name 0.005 0.05 0.048 0.151 0.368
(0.041) (0.054) (0.043) (0.112) (0.273)
Long firm name -0.007 0.04 -0.027 -0.229 -0.761
(0.046) (0.063) (0.044) (0.160) (0.495)
Firm name: w/ geogr. location -0.225*** 0.056 -0.092 -0.884*** -0.194
(0.075) (0.091) (0.078) (0.277) (0.745)
Firm name w/ Danmark, Danish, Dan 0.284*** 0.263** 0.151 0.167 -0.921
(0.105) (0.128) (0.120) (0.273) (1.003)
Legal form: corporation -0.880*** 0.718*** -0.257*** 0.468*** 0.587
(0.107) (0.081) (0.090) (0.157) (0.365)
Legal form: IVS 0.989*** -0.435*** -0.382*** 0.281 -0.284
(0.052) (0.096) (0.071) (0.236) (0.781)
Geogr. region: Midtjylland 0.187*** 0.104* 0.007 0.201 -0.106
(0.044) (0.061) (0.043) (0.125) (0.354)
Geogr. region: Nordjylland 0.285*** 0.062 -0.065 -0.264 -0.532
(0.062) (0.085) (0.061) (0.215) (0.691)
Geogr. region: Sjælland 0.186*** 0.07 0.011 -0.097 0.113
(0.053) (0.075) (0.055) (0.181) (0.431)
Geogr. region: Syddanmark 0.261*** 0.133** 0.036 -0.023 0.361
(0.048) (0.064) (0.047) (0.147) (0.337)
Patents at foundation -0.351 0.659*** -1.232** 0.992*** 3.220***
(0.338) (0.239) (0.498) (0.364) (0.433)
In firm name: a proper danish word 0.088** 0.134*** -0.037 -0.167 -0.484*
(0.035) (0.047) (0.035) (0.102) (0.285)
In firm name: Holding, capital, shares 0.069 -1.272*** 0.072 -1.172*** -0.637
(0.050) (0.114) (0.046) (0.277) (0.492)
In firm name: female name -0.004 -0.226** -0.081 -0.774*** 0.064
(0.058) (0.088) (0.060) (0.273) (0.570)
In firm name: male name -0.079 0.092 -0.015 -0.207 -0.031
(0.048) (0.066) (0.044) (0.173) (0.438)
At least one founders is firm -0.803*** -0.355*** 0.408*** 0.231* 1.126***
(0.049) (0.067) (0.048) (0.129) (0.422)
At least one of founder has female first name 0.072* -0.123* -0.01 0.195 0.764**
(0.043) (0.066) (0.046) (0.155) (0.383)
Team -0.051 0.242*** -0.166*** 0.555*** -0.694
(0.052) (0.072) (0.056) (0.161) (0.568)
# employees year 1: 0 0.142** 1.055*** 0.198** 0.357* 0.491
(0.072) (0.074) (0.086) (0.207) (0.510)
# employees year 1: 1 -0.276*** -0.671*** 0.397*** 0.563*** 0.39
(0.073) (0.087) (0.064) (0.160) (0.448)
# employees year 1: (2,4) 0.286*** -0.922*** 0.430*** 0.780*** 0.581
(0.062) (0.092) (0.068) (0.143) (0.431)
# employees year 1: (5,9) 0.263*** -1.276*** 0.288*** 1.248*** 0.523
(0.095) (0.141) (0.104) (0.181) (0.676)
# employees year 1: (6,49) 0.322*** -3.177*** 0.540*** 1.428*** -0.943
(0.104) (0.334) (0.116) (0.200) (1.405)
No previous founding experience -1.902*** 0.878*** 1.180*** 0.298 0.342
(0.062) (0.105) (0.092) (0.194) (0.593)
Previously founded 1-3 firms -1.985*** 1.071*** 1.027*** 0.354** 0.561
(0.054) (0.092) (0.087) (0.148) (0.475)
Previously founded more than 3 firms -2.563*** 1.242*** 0.929*** 0.582*** 1.246***
(0.065) (0.092) (0.090) (0.154) (0.424)
Earlier invol. exit by one founder 0.574*** 0.08 0.048 0.103 -0.32
(0.061) (0.075) (0.062) (0.168) (0.366)
ln(total assets year 1) -0.141*** 0.079*** -0.192*** 0.046 0.119
(0.016) (0.020) (0.014) (0.040) (0.125)
Total assets year 1 is missing -0.361*** 0.916*** -0.929*** -0.108 1.366
(0.115) (0.153) (0.102) (0.307) (0.913)
2nd quintile profits year 1 -0.497*** -0.347*** -0.158** -0.278 0.523
(0.083) (0.110) (0.079) (0.203) (0.492)
3rd quintile profits year 1 -0.725*** -0.022 -0.362*** -0.590** 0.489
(0.089) (0.112) (0.084) (0.244) (0.527)
4th quintile profits year 1 -0.811*** 0.077 0.505*** -0.121 0.631
(0.086) (0.099) (0.072) (0.179) (0.508)
5th quintile profits year 1 -1.272*** 0.236** 0.939*** -0.457** -1.5
(0.119) (0.106) (0.076) (0.200) (1.115)
Previous exit at same address 0.240*** -0.004 0.072 -0.035 -0.162
(0.046) (0.062) (0.048) (0.144) (0.336)
>9 previous exits at same address 0.283*** -0.063 0.139 -0.262 -0.029
(0.110) (0.134) (0.114) (0.247) (1.052)
Adress unshared -0.015 0.057 0.173** -0.399 0.263
(0.088) (0.121) (0.088) (0.292) (0.756)
Adress shared with 2-5 other firms 0.136* -0.091 0.054 -0.137 0.007
(0.072) (0.093) (0.075) (0.215) (0.488)
Adress shared with 6-10 other firms 0.272*** -0.063 0.019 0.197 0.167
(0.068) (0.088) (0.068) (0.190) (0.381)
Address previously used by 1-5 others 0.067 -0.065 0.008 -0.307* 0.011
(0.055) (0.082) (0.053) (0.178) (0.633)
Address previously used by 6-10 others 0.079 0.056 -0.072 -0.614*** 0.304
(0.070) (0.101) (0.072) (0.222) (0.677)
Address previously used by 11-100 others -0.127 -0.045 0.051 -0.578** 0.408
(0.083) (0.115) (0.084) (0.258) (0.755)
Address previously used by > 100 others -0.430*** 0.031 -0.12 -0.1 -0.042
(0.132) (0.165) (0.131) (0.340) (1.148)
ln(LIX) -0.355*** 0.227 0.085 0.308 0.507
(0.105) (0.148) (0.113) (0.307) (0.806)
Mean word length 0.021** -0.036*** -0.012 0.006 -0.093
(0.009) (0.013) (0.009) (0.029) (0.085)
continued on page over
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Appendix A: Logit estimates continued
High High Inno.
Involuntary exit empl. ret. On subsidy New
exit growth assets program patent
BPS lengths -0.001 0.001 0.001 0.004*** 0.004
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
BPS 2nd quintile 0.034 0.018 0.024 -0.777*** 0.331
(0.054) (0.077) (0.057) (0.213) (0.527)
BPS 3rd quintile 0.019 -0.045 0.044 -0.209 0.28
(0.061) (0.084) (0.064) (0.195) (0.639)
BPS 4th quintile 0.036 0.011 0.077 -0.221 1.108*
(0.070) (0.093) (0.071) (0.207) (0.609)
BPS 5th quintile 0.049 -0.043 0.175** -0.117 1.225*
(0.095) (0.119) (0.089) (0.234) (0.675)
ln(frequency of least common word) -0.008 0.014 0.008 0.016 -0.181**
(0.012) (0.016) (0.013) (0.032) (0.089)
ln(frequency of most common word) 0.02 0.028 -0.035** 0.113** 0.265**
(0.016) (0.022) (0.018) (0.049) (0.112)
Freq. least/freq. most common word -0.003 0 -0.146* -0.02 2.323***
(0.077) (0.108) (0.078) (0.261) (0.630)
A geogr. term name is in BPS -0.009 -0.456*** 0.051 -0.127 0
(0.137) (0.158) (0.127) (0.303) (.)
A male name is in BPS -0.233** 0.099 0.229* -0.224 -1.561
(0.111) (0.127) (0.119) (0.305) (1.638)
A female name is in BPS 0.167 0.031 -0.188 -0.23 0
(0.160) (0.211) (0.175) (0.489) (.)
Founder name index 5.361*** 13.832*** 7.355*** 34.992*** 42.212***
(0.241) (0.895) (0.451) (2.846) (6.608)
Mean industry performance index 4.194*** 7.409*** 6.058*** 6.733*** 5.009***
(0.238) (0.399) (0.334) (0.639) (1.229)
BPS wordscore 7.445*** 20.014*** 9.676*** 35.816*** 28.395***
(0.298) (0.794) (0.469) (2.343) (4.456)
Pseudo R2 0.252 0.249 0.101 0.358 0.436
# obs. 38472 31880 31880 38472 36962
The models additionally include sets of year and sector dummies as well as constant terms. Robust standard errors.
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Appendix B: changes in AUC if variables are left out
Sets of variables included Restricted models
Diff. Diff. Diff.
to full to full to full
Full # employees model Patents model Wordscores model
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) model excluded (in %) excluded (in %) excluded (in %)
Involuntary exit
x 0.623 0.623 0.000 0.623 -0.041 0.623 0.000
x 0.719 0.719 0.000 0.719 0.000 0.719 0.000
x 0.719 0.719 0.000 0.719 0.000 0.611 -0.177
x x 0.683 0.683 0.000 0.683 0.020 0.683 0.000
x x 0.740 0.734 -0.718 0.740 -0.010 0.740 0.000
x x 0.745 0.745 0.000 0.745 -0.001 0.745 0.000
x x 0.743 0.743 0.000 0.743 0.023 0.668 -0.112
x x x 0.763 0.762 -0.141 0.763 0.010 0.763 0.000
x x x 0.755 0.755 0.000 0.756 0.004 0.755 0.000
x x x 0.751 0.751 0.000 0.751 0.022 0.695 -0.080
x x x 0.801 0.798 -0.342 0.801 0.004 0.801 0.000
x x x 0.796 0.796 -0.030 0.796 0.006 0.755 -0.055
x x x 0.780 0.780 0.000 0.780 0.008 0.751 -0.038
x x x x 0.823 0.823 -0.018 0.823 0.006 0.805 -0.022
x x x x 0.784 0.784 0.000 0.784 0.009 0.759 -0.032
x x x x 0.801 0.800 -0.020 0.801 0.011 0.769 -0.040
x x x x 0.751 0.751 0.000 0.751 0.022 0.695 -0.080
x x x x x 0.824 0.824 -0.033 0.824 0.007 0.808 -0.020
Average change across affected models (in % ) -0.267 0.006 -0.066
High employment growth
x 0.591 0.591 0.000 0.589 -0.294 0.591 0.000
x 0.679 0.679 0.000 0.679 0.000 0.679 0.000
x 0.789 0.789 0.000 0.789 0.000 0.662 -0.191
x x 0.684 0.684 0.000 0.682 -0.317 0.684 0.000
x x 0.694 0.652 -6.487 0.692 -0.397 0.694 0.000
x x 0.699 0.699 0.000 0.697 -0.287 0.699 0.000
x x 0.794 0.794 0.000 0.793 -0.071 0.682 -0.164
x x x 0.750 0.713 -5.272 0.749 -0.220 0.750 0.000
x x x 0.729 0.729 0.000 0.727 -0.239 0.729 0.000
x x x 0.787 0.787 0.000 0.787 -0.105 0.707 -0.114
x x x 0.743 0.715 -3.852 0.741 -0.219 0.743 0.000
x x x 0.829 0.801 -3.446 0.828 -0.064 0.738 -0.122
x x x 0.790 0.790 0.000 0.789 -0.082 0.721 -0.096
x x x x 0.824 0.797 -3.418 0.823 -0.072 0.762 -0.082
x x x x 0.785 0.785 0.000 0.785 -0.108 0.736 -0.067
x x x x 0.825 0.795 -3.733 0.824 -0.083 0.766 -0.077
x x x x 0.787 0.787 0.000 0.787 -0.105 0.707 -0.114
x x x x x 0.822 0.793 -3.604 0.821 -0.084 0.779 -0.055
Average change across affected models (in % ) -4.647 -0.172 -0.108
Return on assets of above 20 percent
x 0.561 0.561 0.000 0.561 0.011 0.561 0.000
x 0.629 0.629 0.000 0.629 0.000 0.629 0.000
x 0.658 0.658 0.000 0.658 0.000 0.548 -0.201
x x 0.596 0.596 0.000 0.596 0.053 0.596 0.000
x x 0.608 0.610 0.262 0.608 0.027 0.608 0.000
x x 0.637 0.637 0.000 0.637 0.018 0.637 0.000
x x 0.661 0.661 0.000 0.663 0.171 0.575 -0.150
x x x 0.620 0.618 -0.347 0.621 0.060 0.620 0.000
x x x 0.640 0.640 0.000 0.640 0.017 0.640 0.000
x x x 0.652 0.652 0.000 0.653 0.132 0.598 -0.090
x x x 0.654 0.654 0.116 0.654 0.015 0.654 0.000
x x x 0.674 0.676 0.206 0.675 0.115 0.612 -0.102
x x x 0.677 0.677 0.000 0.677 0.060 0.638 -0.061
x x x x 0.686 0.687 0.143 0.686 0.047 0.654 -0.049
x x x x 0.670 0.670 0.000 0.671 0.053 0.639 -0.048
x x x x 0.666 0.666 0.004 0.666 0.112 0.621 -0.072
x x x x 0.652 0.652 0.000 0.653 0.132 0.598 -0.090
x x x x x 0.679 0.679 0.051 0.679 0.055 0.652 -0.041
Average change across affected models (in % ) 0.123 0.068 -0.091
At least one new patent
x 0.721 0.721 0.000 0.691 -4.141 0.721 0.000
x 0.752 0.752 0.000 0.752 0.000 0.752 0.000
x 0.880 0.880 0.000 0.880 0.000 0.693 -0.270
x x 0.795 0.795 0.000 0.773 -2.755 0.795 0.000
x x 0.787 0.761 -3.428 0.772 -1.932 0.787 0.000
x x 0.794 0.794 0.000 0.788 -0.733 0.794 0.000
x x 0.894 0.894 0.000 0.893 -0.171 0.762 -0.173
x x x 0.814 0.800 -1.808 0.798 -1.992 0.814 0.000
x x x 0.831 0.831 0.000 0.824 -0.866 0.831 0.000
x x x 0.898 0.898 0.000 0.897 -0.179 0.812 -0.106
x x x 0.825 0.816 -1.080 0.820 -0.578 0.825 0.000
x x x 0.903 0.898 -0.529 0.902 -0.145 0.805 -0.121
x x x 0.899 0.899 0.000 0.898 -0.100 0.805 -0.116
x x x x 0.903 0.901 -0.271 0.902 -0.102 0.830 -0.088
x x x x 0.901 0.901 0.000 0.900 -0.097 0.836 -0.077
x x x x 0.906 0.900 -0.632 0.904 -0.177 0.828 -0.094
x x x x 0.898 0.898 0.000 0.897 -0.179 0.812 -0.106
x x x x x 0.904 0.901 -0.360 0.903 -0.116 0.845 -0.071
Average change across affected models (in % ) -1.920 -0.891 -0.122
Participation in an innovation subsidy program
x 0.745 0.745 0.000 0.590 -20.775 0.745 0.000
x 0.745 0.745 0.000 0.745 0.000 0.745 0.000
x 0.880 0.880 0.000 0.880 0.000 0.751 -0.172
x x 0.758 0.758 0.000 0.634 -16.379 0.758 0.000
x x 0.763 0.764 0.034 0.641 -15.986 0.763 0.000
x x 0.769 0.769 0.000 0.739 -3.965 0.769 0.000
x x 0.872 0.872 0.000 0.865 -0.893 0.789 -0.105
x x x 0.774 0.774 0.035 0.671 -13.318 0.774 0.000
x x x 0.775 0.775 0.000 0.739 -4.627 0.775 0.000
x x x 0.862 0.862 0.000 0.865 0.411 0.797 -0.081
x x x 0.784 0.781 -0.397 0.732 -6.532 0.784 0.000
x x x 0.863 0.865 0.308 0.854 -1.036 0.792 -0.089
x x x 0.835 0.835 0.000 0.853 2.175 0.789 -0.058
x x x x 0.836 0.835 -0.022 0.842 0.699 0.792 -0.055
x x x x 0.831 0.831 0.000 0.850 2.281 0.790 -0.052
x x x x 0.856 0.856 0.068 0.852 -0.459 0.799 -0.071
x x x x 0.862 0.862 0.000 0.865 0.411 0.797 -0.081
x x x x x 0.834 0.832 -0.278 0.840 0.687 0.796 -0.048
Average change across affected models (in % ) -0.031 -4.832 -0.081
(i) basic G/S variables, (ii) extended set of G/S variables, (iii) human capital variables, (iv) firm characteristics and (v) BPS
variables.
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